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Mo re  t h a n  f o r t y - f iv e  y e a r s  after the outbreak of the First World War, there still exists under the Turkish 
flag, the battle cruiser Yavuz, once known as 
Goeben. This ship is the last survivor of the 
great rival dreadnought fleets, British and 
German, that confronted each other in 1914. 
She is also the last surviving warship to have 
taken part in the Dardanelles campaign; 
indeed, her escape to Turkish waters in the 
early days of August 1914, almost certainly 
caused that campaign to be fought when and 
as it was.
In view of the effect of the Dardanelles 
campaign upon the rest of the war—and not­
ably upon the fighting on the Western Front 
and upon the affairs of Russia—it is not sur­
prising that Sir Julian Corbett, British official 
naval historian of the First World War and 
author of standard works on the campaigns of 
Nelson and of Drake, described the despatch of 
the Goeben to Constantinople in the following 
terms: “  It is not too much to say that few naval 
decisions more bold and well-judged were ever 
taken.”  In fact, no single ship has ever had 
such a profound influence in modern warfare.
Pursued by a much superior British naval 
force, Goeben, and her small satellite, the light 
cruiser Breslau, had a series of narrow escapes 
in the first hours of the war; later on, under the 
Turkish flag, Goeben was mined twice, twice 
damaged by bombs from the air, stranded 
badly at the entrance to the Dardanelles, 
attacked by enemy battleships and submarines, 
and, as Jane’s Fighting Ships comments: 
“  probably had more narrow escapes from 
destruction than any other dreadnought or 
battle cruiser.”  In peace time, when refitting, 
she also survived the collapse of a floating dock 
beneath her.
The Goeben—named after a general of the 
Franco-Prussian War—was first sent, with the 
Breslau, to the Mediterranean in November 
19 12 ; at that time she was brand new, working 
up after her trials, and her equipment was by 
no means really complete. There was a sudden 
emergency, however, at Constantinople, for 
in the opening days of the First Balkan War 
the Turkish forces in Europe had very nearly 
collapsed, and the Turkish capital was being 
invested by the Bulgarians and might soon fall.
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The presence o f these two ships in the 
Mediterranean at the opening o f the
First World War gave the Germans 
a dangerous advantage. Their escape 
to the Dardanelles had a manifold 
influence on Allied strategy.
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Accordingly, the Turkish government had 
asked the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to 
provide an international fleet to protect the 
inhabitants of the city from the consequences 
of a Bulgarian occupation. The action of the 
Germans in sending a battle cruiser to the 
Mediterranean was a great embarrassment to 
the British Admiralty, which had been con­
centrating all its heavy ships in home waters to 
meet the threat of the new German fleet. Now, 
in order to deal with the Goeben, it was neces­
sary to divert three battle cruisers—Indomi­
table, Inflexible, Indefatigable—as well as 
smaller ships, to the Mediterranean.
Under the original Franco-British naval 
agreement made after the conclusion of the 
Entente Cordiale, it had been decided that 
the British battle fleet should concentrate in the 
North Sea, while the French should look after 
the Mediterranean. The Goeben, however, was 
not only more powerfully armed, but also much 
faster than any of the French battleships and 
cruisers; the only ships in the world that stood 
a chance of catching her, and sinking her when
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No Allied ship could hope to catch her or outgun her, except battle-cruisers detached from the British 
Home Fleet; the Goeben steaming, 1914
caught, were the British battle cruisers, and 
therefore, although they were badly needed in 
the Home Fleet, they had to be sent to the 
Mediterranean.
When the murder of the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand took place, Breslau was at Durazzo 
with other foreign warships, helping to support 
the very shaky throne of Prince William of Wied, 
the nominal king of Albania. The British unit 
of this international force was for a time the 
light cruiser Gloucester, and water polo matches 
between the two ships were a regular occur­
rence. Six weeks after the last match, the two 
ships were in action against each other. Goeben, 
flying the flag of Rear Admiral Souchon, was at 
Haifa, and Souchon learned of the Sarajevo 
affair at a party given by the German consul.
' His first thought was for his boilers, which, on 
account of the haste with which Goeben had been 
sent from Germany, were in so bad a state that 
the ship was only capable of seventeen knots, as 
against a designed speed ten knots faster. 
Souchon signalled Berlin asking that new boiler 
tubes, and dockyard workers to install them, be
sent to the Austrian naval base of Pola, cancel­
led his crusing programme and arranged to be 
at Pola to meet the new tubes when they 
arrived.
While the fitting of the tubes was in pro­
gress, Souchon considered the political situa­
tion, which was far from clear; in theory, under 
the terms of the Triple Alliance, Germany, 
Austria and Hungary and Italy were to be allies 
against France, Russia and perhaps Britain. 
But it soon began to look very much as though 
Italy would be neutral, while the Austrian navy 
seemed to Souchon more likely to be a handicap 
than a help. The first plan worked out by the 
German and Austrian naval staffs was to send 
the principal units of the Austrian fleet out of 
the Adriatic through the Aegean and into the 
Dardanelles, where it was hoped that their 
arrival would persuade Turkey to declare war 
on Russia. Admiral Haus, the Austrian com- 
mander-in-chief, however, stated that this move 
would be impossible and Souchon was there­
fore left to operate on his own with the two 
German ships as best he could. He had one
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immediate target, the French transports in the 
Mediterranean, by which the Nineteenth Army 
Corps was to be moved from North African 
ports to Marseilles on the way to its position 
on the Western Front.
In pursuance of his plan, on August 3rd, 
after coaling at Messina, Souchon sailed. On 
the way from Messina to the Algerian coast, he 
received a wireless signal from Berlin ordering 
him to go at once to the Dardanelles since an 
alliance had been concluded that morning be­
tween Germany and Turkey. Souchon, never­
theless, decided to hold to his original intention 
of bombarding two of the Algerian ports. Next 
morning—August 4th—flying a large Russian 
ensign, Goeben appeared off the port of Philippe- 
ville and opened fire, while Breslau similarly 
attacked Bone, their object being to disrupt any 
arrangements that might have been made to 
sail troop transports from either harbour. Little 
was achieved by this move, except that the sail­
ing of the French transports was delayed for
some three days while convoys were formed, 
instead of the ships being sailed independently 
and unescorted. This might have made an 
important difference to the mobilization plans 
of the French army, but does not, in fact, 
appear to have done so. After the bombard­
ment, Souchon turned his ships eastward again ; 
although the Goeben’s boilers were much im­
proved by the repairs at Pola, some were still 
leaking, which meant that it was necessary to 
coal once more at Messina before making the 
dash for the Dardanelles.
Just after ten o’clock on the morning of the 
4th, as she headed back to Messina from 
Philippeville, Goeben sighted two of the three 
British battle cruisers—Indomitable and Inde­
fatigable—steaming towards her. Britain had 
not yet declared war on Germany and all that 
the British ships could do was to let Goeben 
pass them—to get between her and the French 
transports, and then turn around and follow 
her at full speed. When the preliminary warn­
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ings of the danger of war had gone out from the 
Admiralty on July 27th, the British Mediter­
ranean Fleet under Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne 
was at once concentrated at Malta to coal and 
to make itself completely ready for war, in the 
event of which its first task would be to protect 
the French transports from the Goeben.
The German ships had coaled at Brindisi on 
August 1st and Rear-Admiral Troubridge, 
second-in-command to Admiral Milne, took 
Indomitable and Indefatigable, three armoured 
cruisers (including his own flagship Defence), a 
light cruiser and eight destroyers to the mouth 
of the Adriatic; the German ships slipped round 
from Brindisi to Messina where, as we have 
seen, they coaled again before their attack on 
the Algerian ports. Once they were out of the 
Adriatic and into the Mediterranean, the British 
were left with two groups of possible enemy 
ships to watch, the Germans at Messina and the 
Austrian fleet in the Adriatic. Accordingly, the 
Indomitable and Indefatigable were withdrawn 
from the entrance to the Adriatic and placed 
off Sicily between the Germans and the French 
transport routes, while Troubridge with the 
armoured cruisers remained watching the 
Austrians.
During this time Admiral Milne at Malta 
with his flagship, Inflexible, tried hard to get in 
touch with his French opposite number, 
Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere; but this proved 
difficult, partly because of the comparatively 
primitive state of wireless telegraphy at that 
time. Ignorant of the French plans, Milne 
had to keep his eyes on the Goeben and Breslau, 
which were suspected of trying to break out of 
the Mediterranean through the Straits of 
Gibraltar; a collier was believed to be waiting 
for them at Majorca, and accordingly Indomi­
table and Indefatigable were sent westward at 
full speed to catch the Germans. It was as a 
result of this move that the two British battle 
cruisers met the Goeben returning eastward 
from the bombardment of Philippeville.
As the British ships passed the German, 
international courtesy demanded that if 
Souchon’s flag was flying the British ships 
should salute it. At the same time Souchon 
thought one of the ships coming towards him 
was the flagship of the British commander-in- 
chief, who was senior to Souchon and who
would, therefore, be entitled to a salute from 
the Germans. This situation presented some 
difficulty because all the guns of the German 
ship had been re-loaded with live ammunition 
at the end of the bombardment; Souchon 
thought for a moment of sending a signal 
explaining his predicament but finally decided 
against it. The dilemma was solved, however, 
for Souchon’s flag was not flying, and so there 
was no need for a salute from the British, while 
the senior British officer, Captain F. W. 
Kennedy in Indomitable, was not of flag rank 
and therefore not entitled to a salute from the 
Germans.
For nearly five hours the British ships chased 
the German; all three of them were suffering 
from boiler trouble, so that none was able to 
make its designed speed, but the Goeben 
was the faster ship both in fact and on paper, 
and she began to draw ahead. Meanwhile, 
Kennedy was in contact with the Admiralty in 
London; the British ultimatum had been des­
patched to Berlin but an answer was not due
Exclusive News Agency
a d m i r a l  w i l h e l m  s o u c h o n ,  commander of Goeben; 
a photograph taken while he served under the Turkish 
flag in the war of 1914-1918
235
By courtesy of the Imperial W ar Museum
International courtesy demanded a salute that was not, in fact, fired; Goeben’s pursuers, H .M .S. Indomitable
and H .M .S. Inflexible, at speed
until midnight; his orders were that the very 
faint hopes of peace were not to be jeopardized 
by an attack on the Goeben. Hence she was able 
to get away, back to Messina, being joined just 
outside Italian waters by the Breslau.
At midnight Britain and Germany were at 
war; Italy proclaimed her neutrality and an­
nounced that her territorial waters extended a 
distance of six miles from her shores. Britain, 
relieved of the very considerable nuisance value 
of Italy as an enemy, accepted this definition of 
Italian rights, and the Admiralty so informed 
the ships in the Mediterranean. Later it turned 
out that the Admiralty did not expect that 
recognition of the six-mile limit would be taken 
by the men on the spot to mean that the 
German ships could not be pursued through 
Italian waters; but this was not set forth in any 
signal at the time, and the battle cruisers went 
to a rendezvous off Pantellaria. On the other 
hand, the Gloucester was sent to the southern
end of the Straits of Messina in case the enemy 
broke out in that direction.
Meanwhile, the Germans were coaling at 
Messina, securing some of the coal they wanted 
from a British ship in the harbour, thanks to 
the help of the Italian authorities. Souchon 
throughout his stay in the Mediterranean, both 
in peace and war, handled local authorities, 
Austrian, Italian and Turkish, with a tactful 
intelligence that was to make possible the suc­
cess of an operation that was theoretically 
almost unrealisable.
Coaling went on during the days of August 
5th and 6th; the weather was extremely hot, 
baste was essential and Italian crowds sur­
rounded the ships, ashore and in small boats, 
while the local press published sensational 
accounts of how the Germans were doomed to 
destruction at the hands of the powerful British 
squadrons waiting for them outside territorial 
waters. In fact, all that was awaiting them was,
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as we have seen, the Gloucester. The Germans 
continued coaling until they were physically 
exhausted, and then sailed with their bunkers 
still incompletely filled.
When Souchon left Messina by the southern 
end of the Straits on a fine moonlit night, it was 
his plan to steer, very obviously, north-eastward 
so that his pursuers would believe that he was 
heading back into the Adriatic, and then, at a 
favourable moment, alter course and head to 
the south-east, pass Cape Matapan, and head 
through the Aegean for the entrance to the 
Dardanelles.
All this was observed by the Gloucester, 
which followed the Germans from 8 o’clock on 
the evening of the 6th until about 4.30 on the 
afternoon of the 7th. It was an extremely fine 
performance by her captain, Howard Kelly. 
A single 11-inch shell from Goeben could have 
sunk Gloucester-, but time was vital to Souchon 
and he dared not turn back to deal with the 
British light cruiser, although he did at one 
moment send back Breslau to try to do this; 
Kelly withdrew for a while, and then as soon as 
Breslau turned back again to the east, he was 
after her and Goeben once more, never coming 
dangerously close, never losing sight, and 
always keeping Milne and Troubridge informed 
of the enemy’s position. But this information 
did not enable the British to bring the German 
ships to action; Milne still believed it to be his 
first duty to keep between the Germans and the 
French transports and was at this time steam­
ing slowly eastward between Malta and Sicily 
at about eight knots, while Troubridge did not 
believe that his armoured cruisers, now four in 
number, plus eight destroyers were strong 
enough to enable him to take on the Goeben.
At about the moment that Gloucester was 
ordered to give up the chase, a new develop­
ment came that upset all Souchon’s calculations. 
Orders were received from Berlin not to enter 
the Dardanelles, since the peace party in the 
Turkish cabinet, led by the Grand Vizier, was 
trying to avoid any action that might involve the 
Turks in war with the Triple Entente, and it 
was feared that he was strong enough to bar the 
German ships. Souchon, however, decided to 
disobey orders and continue to the Dardanelles. 
He knew, or believed he knew, the position of 
the swept channels through the Turkish mine­
field and it was his intention to ignore Turkish 
objections, rush the Straits and the Bosphorus, 
and wage war against the Russians in the Black 
Sea. For a while he had to wait for a remote 
rendezvous with a collier on August 8th and 9th 
off the island of Denusa, to the east of Naxos, 
and then he went on his way.
By now, Milne and the battle cruisers had 
lost their last chance o f catching the German 
ships through an Admiralty official sending by 
mistake a signal stating that war had broken 
out with Austria;1 this made Milne once again 
withdraw his ships, to cover the exit from the 
Adriatic. By this time the mistake had been 
discovered, the Germans were safe; on arrival 
off Sedd el Bahr, at the entrance to the Straits, 
they had requested permission to enter Turkish 
waters. This had been given by officers of the 
German military mission serving with the 
Turkish army, and these same officers also 
obtained an order from the Turkish govern­
ment that if  allied warships tried to enter the 
Dardanelles, in pursuit of the Germans, they 
would be fired upon.
And that, for the time being, was the end of 
the affair. Admiral Milne was never again 
employed, and Rear-Admiral Troubridge was 
court-martialled on a charge of “  from negli­
gence or through other default forbearing to 
pursue the chase of His Imperial German 
Majesty’s Ship Goeben being an enemy then 
flying.”  He was acquitted and given command 
of the British naval guns landed in support of 
the Serbians, but never again served at sea.
The Goeben and Breslau were nominally 
transferred to the Turkish flag and received the 
names of Yavuz Sultan Selim (Sultan Selim the 
Dread), afterwards shortened to Yavuz, and 
Midilli (the Turkish name for the island of 
Mytilene). They retained their German crews 
unchanged except for the fact that officers and 
men alike put aside their uniform caps and wore 
the fez—a consignment of which happened to 
be in port at the time. Unfortunately, they 
were of a strange shape and their wearing at that 
time being a matter of religion to the Turks, 
they caused great scandal. In addition, there 
were not enough to go round for both ships’ 
companies, so that libertymen going ashore 
wore the fezzes which they gave up on return to
1 This did not in fact happen until August 13th.
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“ An extremely fine performance by her c a p t a i n t h e  light cruiser, H .M .S. Gloucester, which 
shadowed Goeben on August bth-jth, 1914
ship so that they could be worn by the next 
batch going on leave.
Among the letters received by Troubridge 
condoling with him on the fashion in which 
he had been treated was one from the British 
admiral commanding in the South Atlantic, 
who was then searching for the squadron of 
Graf Spee. In this letter the writer, who was 
Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, said 
that it was clear from the attitude that had been 
taken by the Admiralty to the escape of Goeben 
that if  he were to meet Spee, whose squadron 
was superior in force to his own, it would be his 
duty to engage him whether or not there was 
any chance of success. This is exactly what 
happened on November 1st, 1914, when 
Cradock attacked Spee off Coronel on the west 
coast of South America. Cradock’s two biggest 
ships were sunk, and he and the entire com­
plements of both of them were lost.
In considering the Goeben affair, it is worth 
remembering what happened to several of the 
British ships concerned when, eighteen months 
later, they fought at Jutland. Three out of four 
of the armoured cruisers that had been Trou- 
bridge’s were destroyed, two of them within a 
few minutes of going into action. Similarly, 
Indefatigable and Invincible, a sister ship of 
Inflexible and Indomitable, were both destroyed 
by the gunfire of a single German capital 
ship.
From August until the end of October, 
Souchon, now C-in-C of the Turkish navy, 
worked hard to get that force ready. When he 
was ready, without telling a single Turk, except 
the pro-German war minister, Enver Pasha, he 
took his ships to sea, flying the Turkish flag, 
and proceeded to bombard the Russian Black 
Sea ports of Sebastopol and Novorossisk, with­
out any declaration of war. War between
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Turkey and the Allies of course followed; the 
Russian Black Sea fleet proved an efficient 
force, although for the most part composed of 
obsolescent ships—in the preceding ten years 
the Russian ship-building effort had been con­
centrated on replacing the ships of the Baltic 
fleet lost in the Russo-Japanese war.
Souchon, although vastly outnumbered, was 
able, because of his superior speed and the fact 
that the Goeben was more than twice the size of 
any of the five Russian.battleships, to carry on a 
lively series of skirmishes against the enemy, 
raiding, bombarding and minelaying, until the 
Russians completed two big battleships of 
about the same size as Goeben; the operations 
of the Turkish fleet were then circumscribed, 
since the Russians were able to interfere with 
the supply of coal for Constantinople from 
Zonguldak. Meanwhile, the German naval 
personnel in Turkey were among the very few 
people in that country with any modern 
scientific training, so that some were employed 
combating a plague of locusts in Anatolia while 
others in the neighbourhood of Constantinople 
conducted model allotments as a contribution 
to the food supply.
When the Russian revolution came, the 
Black Sea fleet for many months remained a 
powerful and organized force; and by the time 
it finally collapsed, and the Turks and Germans 
were able in 1918 to occupy Sebastopol as a 
base, Souchon was back in Germany, having 
been succeeded by Vice-Admiral Rebeur- 
Paschwitz. His naval career came to an end 
in November 1918, when he had the misfortune 
to be Governor of Kiel at the time of the 
mutiny of the German fleet.
The last important operation carried out by 
the Goeben and Breslau took place in January 
19 18 ; for the first time for over three years they 
left Turkish waters in a westerly direction and 
entered the Aegean. On the way out of the 
Straits, Goeben was mined but, as this made no 
difference to her sea-worthiness, the sortie was 
continued and two British monitors were sunk 
off Imbros. Almost immediately, the Breslau 
in a very few minutes struck seven mines and 
sank; Goeben regained the entrance to the 
Dardanelles and ran aground off Nagara Point 
where she remained for a week, the target of 
some five hundred bombs, only two of which hit 
her, neither causing serious damage.
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Constantinople in 19 14; a general view of Stamboul across the Golden Horn, with Pera
in the foreground
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BY  l880 BARING HAD BECOME WEARY of his ineffectual position as British Controller in Egypt. Eager to make a drastic over­
haul of the Egyptian finances, he found his 
hands tied in every way. His known preference 
for setting the welfare of the fellahin before the 
interests of the bondholders had exasperated 
the French, whose only thought was to obtain 
their pound of flesh and as much over as 
possible. This, in the context of European 
politics, made Baring a liability to the British 
Government. After six months as Controller, 
Lord Ripon offered him the Financial Member­
ship of the Viceroy’s Council. Warning Riaz 
Pasha for the last time to look to the Army, he 
sailed for Bombay. He remained in India for 
three years, atoning for his brusque omni­
science by his sound conservative financial 
policy and his ability to make up the deficits 
caused by Lord Lytton’s recent Afghan War. 
He had been in India for just under three years 
when “  the Egyptian pot that he had left sim­
mering in 1880 . . .  boiled up and over.”
The Arabist coup d ’état, the riots at Alex­
andria (and its bombardment), Sir Garnet 
Wolseley’s night march and victory at Tel-el- 
Kebir (the first of a series of British operations 
in Egypt and the Sudan which kept our military 
prestige at an artifically high level up to 1899, 
when our bubble reputation was pricked almost 
overnight by the Boer farmers), Arabi’s exile, 
the British Occupation, Lord Dufferin’s mis­
sion—all this is well-known history and needs 
no re-telling here. Wolseley, who had been in 
correspondence with Baring, suggested that he 
should be entrusted with the civil administra­
tion. In September 1883, a gazetted K .C .S.I., 
Sir Evelyn Baring landed at Alexandria and 
entered upon his life’s work. He was aged forty- 
two.
D. G. Hogarth, who has analysed Cromer’s 
personality more penetratingly than his official 
biographer, Lord Zetland, gives the following 
sketch of his character at this point in his 
career:
. . . Not a man of genius, he possessed un­
usually powerful and versatile talents, whose full 
exercise was ensured both by a strong character 
matured in a varied school of experience, and also 
by the vigorous physical constitution of a tall up­
standing man. Level judgment was the qualifica­
tion he most valued, and quick to discern it in
Cromer :
THE MIRACLE 
OF EGYPT
“  Love your country, tell the truth 
and don’t dawdle fo r  a whole 
generation Cromer in Cairo was the 
British Empire personified.
By
JOHN RAYMOND
other men, he was, as a rule, magnificently 
served. Though an optimist, he suspected 
enthusiasm; fantasy, rhapsody and all kinds of 
unstable experience, he cordially disliked; Whig- 
gery, inborn and confirmed by his career, con­
vinced him of his right to lead. Lord Rosebery 
once told him that he “  was a good man to go 
tiger-shooting w ith” ; but perhaps in other 
adventures he was a better leader than colleague, 
his strength of purpose presenting, as was said 
of him, “  a rather granitic surface to persuasion.”  
But he was no Cato to champion causes well lost, 
and, at his own moment, he could be the soul of 
reasonable compromise; and he was always con­
fident that past experience of his loyalty, which 
never defrauded a subordinate of credit due, 
would reassure those whom he might be com­
pelled to sacrifice for the time being. His air of 
conscious superiority and his habitual disinclina­
tion for small talk made him appear somewhat 
difficult of approach; but “  le Grand Ours,”  as 
Cairene society nicknamed its master, could be 
genial enough and keenly appreciate cultivated 
converse and both humour and wit.
The Egyptian situation, when he arrived, 
was dismal. The Treasury was exhausted, the 
Khedive and his Ministers sheltered supinely 
behind the British Occupation and the British
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The citadel of Cairo; a view taken in the 1880’s
troops—an Occupation that had been carried 
out most unwillingly (it had already lost John 
Bright to the Government). “  I rather hope 
that you will be able to advise a further early 
withdrawal of troops at the beginning of next 
year,”  wrote Lord Granville, the Foreign 
Secretary. Lord Northbrook, Baring’s former 
chief in India, now at the Admiralty, advised 
his relative that “  the main question for us is, 
how soon our troops can safely leave Cairo.”  
But his ex-assistant had other and more startling 
ideas. He returned to Cairo, as he later wrote 
in his “  Biographical Notes,”  with the ambition 
“  of leading the Egyptian people from bank­
ruptcy to solvency and then onward to affluence, 
from Khédivial monstrosities to British justice, 
and from Oriental methods veneered with a 
spurious European civilization towards the 
true civilization of the West, based on the 
principles of the Christian moral code.”  He 
remained in Egypt for almost a quarter of a 
century. By the end of that time, all these aims
Radio Times Hulton Picture Library 
Creator of a beneficent but unpopular régime; EVELYN 
BARING, Earl of Cromer, 1841-1917
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That most foolish boy a b b a s  i i , Khedive of Egypt, 
1892-1914
had in large measure been achieved and two 
others been added. The Anglo-French Agree­
ment, for which Baring, as much as Delcasse, 
Paul Cambon or Lord Landsdowne, was res­
ponsible, had been signed, and the Sudan had 
been restored to Egypt.
The defeat and death of Hicks Pasha at El- 
Obeid, the loss of the Sudan and the subse- 
sequent tragedy of Gordon, was Baring’s first
major problem as British Agent and Consul- 
General. The story of Gordon has burned itself 
into British folk-legend; it has been told so 
many times and from so many different angles 
that it is unnecessary to waste much space on it 
here—it played a merely episodic part in 
Baring’s Egyptian career. Four points, how­
ever, can usefully be made. First, as R. C. K. 
Ensor, that shrewd historian of the British nine­
teenth century, remarked tersely, the abandon­
ment of Gordon, “  though distressing, left no 
permanent mark upon the world.”  Secondly, 
Baring opposed Gordon’s appointment from 
the very beginning, on grounds of the hero’s 
temperament, and was only over-ruled by the 
Cabinet’s compelling pressure. Thirdly, as 
Zetland makes plain in his biography, Lytton 
Strachey’s treatment of Baring in his essay on 
Gordon is found upon inspection, as is so often 
the case with the characters of this “  Georgian 
Novelist,”  to be utterly false. (We shall return 
to this point later.) Finally, although Strachey, 
in his typical and diabolically effective manner, 
deliberately heightened the contrast between 
Báring and Gordon (much as, in the same way, 
he set Manning off against Newman), there is 
an even odder correspondence between the two 
men than Strachey—and no other writer, as far 
as one knows—seems ever to have remarked. 
Both men were secretly or semi-consciously 
hell-bent on great corporate works of mercy 
and merit that far exceeded their Government’s 
instructions. Gordon, ordered to evacuate the 
Sudan, dreamt only of redeeming it from 
slavery. Baring, instructed to settle Egypt and 
so ensure the early withdrawal of British 
troops, used the ultimate military sanction to 
back his “  veiled protectorate ” —the protec­
torate that eventually established a beneficent 
though unpopular regime of justice and pros­
perity throughout the country.
What was the substance of Baring’s achieve­
ments in Egypt? To his contemporaries, the 
work that he and his team of picked men per­
formed seemed staggering enough: his earl­
dom, his Order of Merit, the £50,000 voted 
him by Parliament—for a mere civilian, a 
unique national testimonial!—together with 
the great appointments that he refused (Lord 
Esher’s Papers suggest that he was canvassed as 
Foreign Secretary in the formation of Campbell-
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Bannerman’s Government, and it is a known 
fact that he turned down the offer of the 
Embassy at Berlin after his retirement)—all 
this attests to the legendary regard in which 
he was held by the Englishmen of his own time. 
For our generation, grown shy and defensive 
about our share in “  the White Man’s Burden,”  
his life-work needs recapitulating. In twenty 
years he worked a miracle in Egypt, transform­
ing the finances of a country heading for bank­
ruptcy into one whose credit in the money 
markets of the world “  stood second only to 
that of France and England.”  Direct and in­
direct taxation was reduced, the hated courbash, 
and the even more hated corvee, were abolished; 
Egypt’s vast Public Debt was reduced and a 
substantial reserve fund built up; irrigation 
works second only to those achieved by British 
engineers in India were undertaken; the thirsty 
fields of the Nile Valley, long the prey of foreign 
creditors and speculators, were restored to their 
peasant-owners. An army was created, the 
odious prison system abolished, slave-markets 
put down, sanitary and medical administra­
tion established, higher and lower education 
taken in hand. “  Justice,”  as Zetland records, 
“  had ceased to be a commodity to be hawked 
in the market-place and knocked down to the 
highest bidder.”  The major obstacle to efficient 
rule in Egypt—the futile system of “  legislative 
diplomacy ”  by which all reform was bedevilled 
and held up by “  the combined Cabinets of 
Europe and America who now legislate—or who 
refuse to legislate—for Egypt,”  took longer to 
resolve. The envy and amour-propre of France, 
the policy, so sedulously and brilliantly pursued 
by Bismarck, of keeping the Great European 
Powers divided—all this, together with the 
financial niggardliness of successive British 
governments, helped to depress the flying speed 
of the A l Lurd’s benevolent despotism. As 
early as 1886, Baring warned Lord Rosebery 
that “  Berlin, and not Cairo, is the real centre 
of gravity of Egyptian affairs.”  The Anglo- 
French Agreement of 1904, for which Baring 
and his assistant and successor, Eldon Gorst, 
worked so strenuously and with such skilful 
enthusiasm, finally put an end to the spectre of 
interference from without that haunted Baring 
and his “  kindergarten ”  for most of their time 
in Egypt. In formulating and forcing through
the eventual North African settlement with 
France, Baring saved his protectorate—and 
became an unwitting agent of the Armageddon 
that followed ten years later.
It was during these years that the iron that 
attends all proconsuls acting within the context 
of a political democracy entered Cromer’s 
soul. His distrust of Egyptian nationalism—for 
Young Egypt, as for Young Turkey, Young 
India or Young China—was unbounded. His 
scorn of the Khédivial Ministers, for the 
Ottomanized beys and pashas that surrounded 
Tewfik and his young son, Abbas II, who suc­
ceeded in 1892, was blistering. His distrust of 
the Mixed Tribunals was unwavering and 
justified, and, like the rest of his proconsular 
behaviour, portentous. “  By smoking cigar­
ettes for the space of about one hour,”  he told 
Lord Granville, “  I threw such a gloom over 
the meeting—as they were all waiting for me 
to speak—that I expect nothing more of the 
kind will take place. I thought that this was 
on the whole a better plan than refusing to 
attend.”  Aloof, omniscient, forbidding, Baring 
(especially after he became Lord Cromer) was 
never seen to such an advantage as in his 
silences. A concealed strength, a chilling con­
tempt, were the most powerful weapons in his 
armoury. “  Those who govern best make the 
least noise”  might have been the motto engraved 
over the ante-rooms of the Residency. The 
Princess Nazli Fazil, queen of Cairene society, 
the woman who so fascinated young Margot 
Tennant on her Egyptian holiday in the early 
nineties, told Ronald Storrs—the young and 
budding civilian who has left such a moving 
description of Cromer’s kindergarten in its last 
heyday—how she was once sitting with her 
cousin Tewfik when a shout was heard far 
down the street. “  Listen,”  muttered the 
Khedive, turning pale. “  I recognize the cries 
of the Sais before the carriage of Baring. Who 
knows what he is coming to say to me ? ”  
Analysing the numinous prestige of this 
extraordinary man who knew Turkish but no 
Arabic and for his first years administered 
Egypt without a secretary, Ronald Storrs wrote :
Every morning the Financial Adviser visited 
the Lord (for whom he was in effect Prime 
Minister) for his daily interview, and Ethering- 
ton and I learned to draw from his expression
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deductions which sometimes proved surprisingly 
accurate. For the Lord was no respecter of 
persons, and the weight of his prestige could on 
occasion impart a dread momentum to his impact. 
The power of Lord Cromer’s name was tremen­
dous; and the status of the “  Agency ”  in official 
precedence ranking only with the other Con- 
sulates-General and wholly without the splen­
dours of a Viceroy, an Indian or Colonial Ambas­
sador, amounted in Egypt, for foreigners as well 
as Egyptians, to that of to, Downing Street 
multiplied by Buckingham Palace. . . . On a day 
of high political tension Cairo had been re­
assured by the mere sight of that well-known 
figure driving across the river to play tennis in 
Gezira. Recommendations for employment issu­
ing from the quarter where the will became the 
fact were in effect orders; so much so that it was 
not until a number had been received by a com­
paratively minor official that they were dis­
covered to have emanated from one of the 
Agency Cavasses, who was selling official note- 
paper at five pounds a sheet—the prospective 
candidate supplying his own requirements in a 
script as near as he could get to the notorious 
illegibility of the Lord. . . . Only once was his 
authoritative impatience of ceremony rumoured 
to have sustained a reverse. Arriving in London 
on leave from Egypt he applied for an audience 
with the King. It was granted—for three days
From: "  The Authentic Arabian Horse and his Descendants,” by 
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Fro)n his patriarchal retreat he poured out a spate of 
indignation upon Cromer’s head; W i l f r i d  s c a w e n  
b l u n t  (1840-1922), poet and Arabophile
later. Lord Cromer intimated to the Private 
Secretary that he had hoped to be received that 
very afternoon, in order that he might catch the 
night train for his holiday in Scotland. “  He seems 
to take me for the Khedive ”  answered King 
Edward.
Like most great men, Cromer had his 
critics. The chief and most unremitting of 
them was his celebrated Egyptophil neigh­
bour, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, who, from his 
patriarchal retreat at Sheikh Obeyd poured 
a continuous stream of indignation upon the 
British Agent’s head. At this distance, there is 
something richly comic in the spectacle of these 
two men, so nearly of the same age, so utterly 
dissimilar in their attitude to the country they 
both loved so well. The ebullient, warm­
hearted but undoubtedly cranky Blunt was the 
complete contrast to the frigid and rectilinear 
proconsul. Blunt was a prolific but an uneven 
poet, a hardened traveller—he and his remark­
able wife, Lady Anne Blunt, penetrated the 
little-known region of the Nejd as early as 1878 
—a discerning judge of Arab horseflesh and an 
inveterate inveigher against imperialism in any 
form (he had been imprisoned for nationalist 
agitation in Ireland in 1887). England, his 
D.N.B. biographer has well said, “  was the chief 
object of his detestation. The belief grew into 
an obsession, and Blunt came to speak and write 
as i f  England were always in the wrong, and her 
opponents always wise and reasonable men. He 
was perfectly sincere in his opinion; he 
genuinely believed that the pursuit of imperial­
ism dishonoured his fellow countrymen.”
As is often the case with the aristocratic 
altruist, Blunt possessed powerful connections. 
Sir William Harcourt and his son, Lewis, Mr. 
Labouchere and Lord Lyons, all felt the weight 
of his indignant pen. Lord Salisbury, Arthur 
Balfour, George Wyndham, even Mr. Glad­
stone himself, were not spared the lash of his 
generous and muddle-headed protestation. 
Try as he might—and, being a man of means 
with an idee fixe, he spent half the year in 
England lobbying the great in favour of his pet 
Arabist schemes and in denigration of the Lord 
—Blunt was no match for Cromer. As the 
latter grandly explained to Lord Salisbury, after 
the Prime Minister had been pestered with yet 
one more of Blunt’s interminable memor­
andums,
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Egypt is a nondescript country. Take away 
the Suez Canal, the railways, the telegraph to 
Europe, the European Colonies and trade, the 
Capitulations, the External Debt, the Mixed 
Tribunals, make Blunt English Consul-General, 
and a government such as he would have might 
work. . . . Under present conditions, however, I 
should regard a proposal to make one of Blunt’s 
friends Ruler or Prime Minister of Egypt as little 
less absurd as the nomination of some savage Red 
Indian Chief to be the Governor-General of 
Canada.
The ten-year spell between 1888-98 was the 
high water mark of Cromer’s ascendancy in 
Egypt. His pertinacity, his imperturbability 
(even when menaced by gout), his unflinching 
preference for his own methods and his own 
men, had finally won out. The bugbear of a 
Convention with Constantinople had fallen 
through, two domestic crises of January ’93 
and ’94 had been surmounted; Abbas II— 
“  that most foolish boy ” —had been brought 
to heel in a manner that was as tactless as it 
was effective. Kitchener had re-conquered 
the Sudan with the minimum of expense 
and the lowest cost to Cromer’s blue-shirted 
fellahin—the pauper peasants for whom he 
worked so tirelessly. All his life he had hus­
banded his patience for Orientals, but he had 
never suffered Western fools gladly and the 
increase of his power failed to make him less 
uncharitable. He endured, wrote Sir Rennell 
Rodd, “  rather than enjoyed his obligations to 
the visitors for whom the great proconsul was 
one of the mirabilia of their winter experience.”  
“  ‘ Well,’ he would say, leaning slightly for­
ward with his hands on the arms of his chair, 
when he thought that it was time that an inter­
view was brought to an end, ‘ is there anything 
else ’ ? ”  “  You tell me,”  he wrote grimly to 
one of his subordinates, “  that next year you 
intend ‘ to refuse to give the men.’ That will 
depend on the orders you receive from your 
official superiors. It is highly improbable that 
you will be allowed to act as you suppose.”  
Meanwhile, his strength was failing. For 
years he had worked with the blind daemonic 
energy of the master builder, and early in 1907 
his medical advisers gave him a final warning. 
He had been living on his physical capital; to 
continue to do so would prove fatal. Wearily, 
Cromer made his decision in favour of retire­
ment. For three months he had been living
Victor at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882 and promoter of 
Cromer’s fortunes, g e n e r a l  s i r  g a r n e t  w o l s e l e v
entirely on Benger’s Food. Too weak and 
shaken to endure a public banquet, he settled 
for a public address in the Opera House at 
Cairo. His own speech in reply, Storrs tells 
us, “  was clear, direct and militant; containing 
a fateful tribute from the latest of the foreign to 
the first of the national dictators of Egypt: 
Unless, he said, ‘ I am much mistaken, a career 
of great public usefulness lies before the present 
Minister of Education, Saad Zaghlul Pasha. He 
possesses all the qualities necessary to serve his 
country. He is honest, he is capable; he has the 
courage of his convictions; he has been abused 
by many of the less worthy of his own country­
men. These are high qualifications. He should 
go far
Back in England, Cromer went direct into 
a nursing home for six weeks, while the 
tributes to his achievement poured in from 
all over the Empire. (“  Except for a king or 
two,”  wrote the British envoy at Addis Ababa, 
“  yours was the only foreigner’s name outside 
Abyssinia that Menelek knew, and he had a 
very wholesome respect for it.”  In Egypt itself
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he was long mourned—not by the Khédivial 
entourage, who had practically one and all boy­
cotted his leaving ceremony, at Abbas I I ’s in­
stigation, but by the common people of the 
country. “  Was it not you,”  queried a peasant 
in the early 1920’s, meeting Harry Boyle, the 
legendary ex-Oriental Secretary and Cromer’s 
confidant, “  was it not you that used to walk on 
the Nile banks with Kroumer when he talked 
to the people ? ”  Being told this was indeed so, 
he kissed Boyle’s hand, exclaiming, “  Greetings 
and welcome! Thanks be to God for your 
return to us ! ”
Soon Cromer was about again, immersed in 
the business of being the Elder Statesman. His 
active brain, declared Edmund Gosse, could not 
bear “ to be left stranded with no theme on 
which to expatiate.”  By temperament one of 
nature’s cross-benchers, he found it difficult to 
affiliate himself with either party in the House 
of Lords. Politically, he was a laissez-faire Free 
Trader, one of the stern unbending individua­
lists who believed that the primary duty of a 
Government is to administer. Finding the 
Unionist Free Trade Club too radical for his 
taste, he helped launch a new organization, the 
Constitutional Free Trade Association, since 
“  I find it very difficult to co-operate heartily 
with a body which contains members such as 
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.”  His zeal both for 
vivisection and for the R.S.P.C.A. involved him 
in difficulties with both bodies, though on most 
other subjects—Tory Democracy, female suf­
frage and the merits of the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement (which he defended in the House of 
Lords)—his views were brusque and quite 
decisive. He arbitrated rail strikes, he corre­
sponded (as who, in that age, did not?) with 
Mrs. Humphrey Ward, he assisted in the 
amalgamation of boroughs in the Potteries. Up 
to the end of his life (he died in 1917) he was 
still in harness, his last assignment—and it was 
one that he took on himself very reluctantly—
being to act as chairman of the Dardanelles 
Commission of Inquiry.
In 1908, Modern Egypt, the record of his 
stewardship, was published; at once it became a 
“  prestige ”  best-seller. All his life Cromer 
read omnivorously and his appetite for history 
of every kind is reflected in the pages of his 
book. “  Sometimes,”  declared Gosse, “  the 
modern life of Egypt, exciting as it was, almost 
seemed a phantasmagoria, dancing across the 
real world of Rameses.”  The phrase is neat 
enough, but in fact Cromer might be said to 
have entertained a didactic rather than a con­
templative view of history.
. . . Huge armaments involved heavy expendi­
ture and high taxation; high taxation was synony­
mous with unsound finance; unsound finance was 
a primary cause of bad government; and, as 
Publius Syrus observed, bad government will 
bring to the ground the mightiest Government.
That was the way Cromer’s historical imagina­
tion worked.
To Lytton Strachey, with his oblique and 
late eighteenth-century temperament, Baring 
was “  a man all in monochrome, touched in 
with cold blues and indecisive greys—eminently 
unromantic.”  “  He wrote a despatch—a long, 
balanced, guarded, grey despatch, informing the 
Government that he ‘ ventured to think ’ etc.”  
Men who are in the habit of drafting public 
documents that may one day have to stand 
publication must necessarily write with cau­
tion, though they may not, for that reason alone, 
be labelled unromantic. As we have seen, 
Baring had his own kind of romance—though, 
unfortunately, it was not of the type that 
Strachey, the intellectual disciple of Voltaire 
and G. E. Moore, the emotional disciple of 
Beckford and Beddoes, might feel himself able 
to approve. Cromer’s apologia was abrupt and 
Catonian. As he once told the boys of Leys 
School: “  Love your country, tell the truth and 
don’t dawdle.”
(Concluded)
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